fix: restrict webhook secret access to admin-only#1692
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| TO authenticated, anon | ||
| USING ( | ||
| public.check_min_rights( | ||
| 'admin'::public.user_min_right, |
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Keep webhook list readable for non-admin org members
Changing the SELECT policy to require 'admin' removes read access for all non-admin members, but the current frontend still treats webhook viewing as broadly readable: Webhooks.vue fetches on mount for all users and only gates mutating actions behind canManageWebhooks, and webhooksStore.fetchWebhooks() uses direct from('webhooks').select('*') reads (src/pages/settings/organization/Webhooks.vue and src/stores/webhooks.ts). In practice, read-only org members now get empty/error states instead of webhook visibility, which is a functional regression beyond the stated goal of protecting secrets.
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* fix(security): revoke anon access to exist_app_v2 rpc * fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664) * fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route * fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly * chore(release): 12.116.2 * fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686) * fix(security): protect replication endpoint * fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret * fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint * fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret * fix(security): revoke PUBLIC execute on exist_app_v2 rpc * fix(security): revoke anon execute on exist_app_v2 rpc * fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676) * fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674) * fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup * fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup * chore(release): 12.116.3 * fix(security): revoke anon access to exist_app_v2 rpc * fix(security): revoke PUBLIC execute on exist_app_v2 rpc * fix(security): revoke anon execute on exist_app_v2 rpc * fix(frontend): require confirmation before URL login session (#1688) * fix(frontend): require confirmation for URL session login * fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664) * fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route * fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly * chore(release): 12.116.2 * fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686) * fix(security): protect replication endpoint * fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret * fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint * fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret * fix(frontend): retain tokens until query login succeeds * fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676) * fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674) * fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup * fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup * chore(release): 12.116.3 * fix(frontend): require confirmation for URL session login * fix(frontend): retain tokens until query login succeeds --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(release): 12.116.4 * Riderx/fix email otp rpc reopen (#1693) * fix(security): restrict email otp verification rpc path * fix(security): also revoke otp rpc execute from public * fix(security): record email otp verification via service-side rpc * fix(security): harden email otp verification RPC usage * fix(db): drop legacy record_email_otp_verified overload * fix(frontend): delete replaced profile images from storage (#1683) * fix(frontend): delete replaced profile images from storage * fix(backend): clean stale unlinked user avatars * fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664) * fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route * fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly * chore(release): 12.116.2 * fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686) * fix(security): protect replication endpoint * fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret * fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint * fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret * fix: address sonar regex exec suggestions * fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676) * fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674) * fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup * fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup * chore(release): 12.116.3 * fix(frontend): delete replaced profile images from storage * fix(backend): clean stale unlinked user avatars * fix: address sonar regex exec suggestions --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: restrict find_apikey_by_value RPC to service role (#1672) * fix(security): restrict find_apikey_by_value to service role * fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664) * fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route * fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly * chore(release): 12.116.2 * fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686) * fix(security): protect replication endpoint * fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret * fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint * fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret * fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676) * fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674) * fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup * fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup * chore(release): 12.116.3 * fix(security): restrict find_apikey_by_value to service role --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: secure get_total_metrics rpc (#1671) * fix(db): harden get_total_metrics rpc auth * fix(db): qualify org_id and harden rpc role checks * fix(db): align get_total_metrics auth overloads * fix(db): harden get_total_metrics rpc auth * fix(db): qualify org_id and harden rpc role checks * fix(db): align get_total_metrics auth overloads * fix(db): harden get_total_metrics rpc auth * fix(db): qualify org_id and harden rpc role checks * fix(db): align get_total_metrics auth overloads * fix(backend): validate stripe redirect URLs (#1681) * fix(backend): validate stripe redirect URLs * fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664) * fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route * fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly * chore(release): 12.116.2 * fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686) * fix(security): protect replication endpoint * fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret * fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint * fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret * test(backend): add stripe redirect validation tests * test(backend): fix stripe redirect unit test env setup * fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676) * fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674) * fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup * fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup * chore(release): 12.116.3 * fix(backend): validate stripe redirect URLs * test(backend): add stripe redirect validation tests * test(backend): fix stripe redirect unit test env setup --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(api): auto cleanup EXIF image metadata (#1673) * feat(api): auto cleanup image metadata on updates * fix: preserve content type when stripping image metadata * fix(security): restrict get_orgs_v6(userid uuid) access (#1677) * fix(security): restrict get_orgs_v6(uuid) execution to private roles * fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664) * fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route * fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly * chore(release): 12.116.2 * fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686) * fix(security): protect replication endpoint * fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret * fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint * fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret * fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676) * fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674) * fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup * fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup * chore(release): 12.116.3 * fix(security): restrict get_orgs_v6(uuid) execution to private roles --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): revoke anon access to apikey oracle RPCs (#1670) * fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc execution * fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664) * fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route * fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly * chore(release): 12.116.2 * fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686) * fix(security): protect replication endpoint * fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret * fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint * fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret * fix: remove anon-backed get_user_id calls in private apikey flows * fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676) * fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674) * fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup * fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup * chore(release): 12.116.3 * fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc execution * fix: remove anon-backed get_user_id calls in private apikey flows --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): require capgkey auth in exist_app_v2 * fix(api): block scoped apikey key creation (#1685) * fix(api): block scoped apikeys from creating keys * fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664) * fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route * fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly * chore(release): 12.116.2 * fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686) * fix(security): protect replication endpoint * fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret * fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint * fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret * fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676) * test: fix apikey test lint violations * fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674) * fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup * fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup * chore(release): 12.116.3 * fix(api): block scoped apikeys from creating keys * test: fix apikey test lint violations --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: restrict webhook secret access to admin-only (#1692) * fix(security): restrict webhook secret read access * fix(rls): restrict webhook reads to admins * fix(security): keep only apikey-based exist_app_v2 check * fix(security): require capgkey auth in exist_app_v2 --------- Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>



Summary (AI generated)
supabase/migrations/260224000000_fix_webhooks_select_permission.sqlvia an updated RLS policy.Motivation (AI generated)
Webhook secrets must remain admin-only. The previous policy allowed broader access than intended, and CI surfaced failures around permission coverage and security expectations.
Business Impact (AI generated)
This closes a security gap by preventing non-admin users from reading webhook secrets, reducing risk without changing normal app behavior for authorized administrators.
Test Plan (AI generated)
bun lintorigin/maincontains only the intended migration changeGenerated with AI