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fix: restrict webhook secret access to admin-only#1692

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riderx merged 2 commits intomainfrom
riderx/fix-ci-issues
Feb 25, 2026
Merged

fix: restrict webhook secret access to admin-only#1692
riderx merged 2 commits intomainfrom
riderx/fix-ci-issues

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@riderx riderx commented Feb 25, 2026

Summary (AI generated)

  • Restricted webhook secret reads to admin users in supabase/migrations/260224000000_fix_webhooks_select_permission.sql via an updated RLS policy.
  • Updated permissions so CI policy checks for webhook access no longer fail while keeping admin workflows unchanged.

Motivation (AI generated)

Webhook secrets must remain admin-only. The previous policy allowed broader access than intended, and CI surfaced failures around permission coverage and security expectations.

Business Impact (AI generated)

This closes a security gap by preventing non-admin users from reading webhook secrets, reducing risk without changing normal app behavior for authorized administrators.

Test Plan (AI generated)

  • Run bun lint
  • Confirmed branch diff against origin/main contains only the intended migration change
  • Run/observe related backend CI checks in this PR run

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  • supabase/migrations/20260224000000_fix_webhooks_select_permission.sql
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Reviewed commit: 09fcec4506

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TO authenticated, anon
USING (
public.check_min_rights(
'admin'::public.user_min_right,

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P2 Badge Keep webhook list readable for non-admin org members

Changing the SELECT policy to require 'admin' removes read access for all non-admin members, but the current frontend still treats webhook viewing as broadly readable: Webhooks.vue fetches on mount for all users and only gates mutating actions behind canManageWebhooks, and webhooksStore.fetchWebhooks() uses direct from('webhooks').select('*') reads (src/pages/settings/organization/Webhooks.vue and src/stores/webhooks.ts). In practice, read-only org members now get empty/error states instead of webhook visibility, which is a functional regression beyond the stated goal of protecting secrets.

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@riderx riderx merged commit 5cb5da2 into main Feb 25, 2026
14 checks passed
@riderx riderx deleted the riderx/fix-ci-issues branch February 25, 2026 04:42
riderx added a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 25, 2026
* fix(security): revoke anon access to exist_app_v2 rpc

* fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664)

* fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route

* fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly

* chore(release): 12.116.2

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686)

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint

* fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret

* fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint

* fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret

* fix(security): revoke PUBLIC execute on exist_app_v2 rpc

* fix(security): revoke anon execute on exist_app_v2 rpc

* fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676)

* fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674)

* fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup

* fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup

* chore(release): 12.116.3

* fix(security): revoke anon access to exist_app_v2 rpc

* fix(security): revoke PUBLIC execute on exist_app_v2 rpc

* fix(security): revoke anon execute on exist_app_v2 rpc

* fix(frontend): require confirmation before URL login session (#1688)

* fix(frontend): require confirmation for URL session login

* fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664)

* fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route

* fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly

* chore(release): 12.116.2

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686)

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint

* fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret

* fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint

* fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret

* fix(frontend): retain tokens until query login succeeds

* fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676)

* fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674)

* fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup

* fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup

* chore(release): 12.116.3

* fix(frontend): require confirmation for URL session login

* fix(frontend): retain tokens until query login succeeds

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore(release): 12.116.4

* Riderx/fix email otp rpc reopen (#1693)

* fix(security): restrict email otp verification rpc path

* fix(security): also revoke otp rpc execute from public

* fix(security): record email otp verification via service-side rpc

* fix(security): harden email otp verification RPC usage

* fix(db): drop legacy record_email_otp_verified overload

* fix(frontend): delete replaced profile images from storage (#1683)

* fix(frontend): delete replaced profile images from storage

* fix(backend): clean stale unlinked user avatars

* fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664)

* fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route

* fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly

* chore(release): 12.116.2

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686)

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint

* fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret

* fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint

* fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret

* fix: address sonar regex exec suggestions

* fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676)

* fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674)

* fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup

* fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup

* chore(release): 12.116.3

* fix(frontend): delete replaced profile images from storage

* fix(backend): clean stale unlinked user avatars

* fix: address sonar regex exec suggestions

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: restrict find_apikey_by_value RPC to service role (#1672)

* fix(security): restrict find_apikey_by_value to service role

* fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664)

* fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route

* fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly

* chore(release): 12.116.2

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686)

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint

* fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret

* fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint

* fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret

* fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676)

* fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674)

* fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup

* fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup

* chore(release): 12.116.3

* fix(security): restrict find_apikey_by_value to service role

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: secure get_total_metrics rpc (#1671)

* fix(db): harden get_total_metrics rpc auth

* fix(db): qualify org_id and harden rpc role checks

* fix(db): align get_total_metrics auth overloads

* fix(db): harden get_total_metrics rpc auth

* fix(db): qualify org_id and harden rpc role checks

* fix(db): align get_total_metrics auth overloads

* fix(db): harden get_total_metrics rpc auth

* fix(db): qualify org_id and harden rpc role checks

* fix(db): align get_total_metrics auth overloads

* fix(backend): validate stripe redirect URLs (#1681)

* fix(backend): validate stripe redirect URLs

* fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664)

* fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route

* fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly

* chore(release): 12.116.2

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686)

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint

* fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret

* fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint

* fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret

* test(backend): add stripe redirect validation tests

* test(backend): fix stripe redirect unit test env setup

* fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676)

* fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674)

* fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup

* fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup

* chore(release): 12.116.3

* fix(backend): validate stripe redirect URLs

* test(backend): add stripe redirect validation tests

* test(backend): fix stripe redirect unit test env setup

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(api): auto cleanup EXIF image metadata (#1673)

* feat(api): auto cleanup image metadata on updates

* fix: preserve content type when stripping image metadata

* fix(security): restrict get_orgs_v6(userid uuid) access (#1677)

* fix(security): restrict get_orgs_v6(uuid) execution to private roles

* fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664)

* fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route

* fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly

* chore(release): 12.116.2

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686)

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint

* fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret

* fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint

* fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret

* fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676)

* fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674)

* fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup

* fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup

* chore(release): 12.116.3

* fix(security): restrict get_orgs_v6(uuid) execution to private roles

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): revoke anon access to apikey oracle RPCs (#1670)

* fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc execution

* fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664)

* fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route

* fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly

* chore(release): 12.116.2

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686)

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint

* fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret

* fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint

* fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret

* fix: remove anon-backed get_user_id calls in private apikey flows

* fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676)

* fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674)

* fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup

* fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup

* chore(release): 12.116.3

* fix(security): restrict apikey oracle rpc execution

* fix: remove anon-backed get_user_id calls in private apikey flows

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): require capgkey auth in exist_app_v2

* fix(api): block scoped apikey key creation (#1685)

* fix(api): block scoped apikeys from creating keys

* fix(build): restore TUS HEAD upload routing (#1664)

* fix(build): handle tus HEAD upload route

* fix(build): chain HEAD middleware correctly

* chore(release): 12.116.2

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint (#1686)

* fix(security): protect replication endpoint

* fix(api): require replication endpoint internal api secret

* fix(api): allow admin JWT access to replication endpoint

* fix(frontend): use admin session only when no replication secret

* fix(database): enforce org-scoped webhook rls (#1676)

* test: fix apikey test lint violations

* fix: use exact app_id match for preview lookup (#1674)

* fix(backend): use exact app_id match for preview lookup

* fix(backend): preserve case-insensitive preview app lookup

* chore(release): 12.116.3

* fix(api): block scoped apikeys from creating keys

* test: fix apikey test lint violations

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: restrict webhook secret access to admin-only (#1692)

* fix(security): restrict webhook secret read access

* fix(rls): restrict webhook reads to admins

* fix(security): keep only apikey-based exist_app_v2 check

* fix(security): require capgkey auth in exist_app_v2

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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