Gcp workstations privesc & container escape [grte-bstevens] #257
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Add a new guide documenting privilege escalation paths for GCP Cloud Workstations. Covers Docker-in-Docker container breakout via /var/run/docker.sock, step-by-step escape to the host VM, stealing the VM service account token from IMDS, persistence by backdooring the host home, network pivot techniques, and recommended countermeasures. Includes reference to an automation script and training banners.
Removed introductory content and references related to Cloud Workstations.
Removed the inclusion of hacktricks-training banner from the GCP privilege escalation documentation.
Removed countermeasures section from GCP privilege escalation documentation.
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This PR adds a new documentation page detailing privilege escalation techniques for Google Cloud Workstations. It focuses on the default "Docker-in-Docker" configuration, which exposes the Docker socket and allows for container breakout to the underlying Compute Engine VM.
Key Additions:
Attack Path: Documented the full kill chain: Container -> Host Root -> IMDS Identity Theft.
Persistence: Added a specific vector regarding the shared UID/Home Directory structure (/home/user) which allows attackers to maintain access across workstation rebuilds.
Network Pivoting: Detailed how the shared network namespace (--net=host) allows the workstation to be used as a bridge to scan the internal VPC.
Related Tools: References a new PoC tool gcp-workstations-containerEscapeScript for automating this breakout.