Fix buffer overflow vulnerability in format()#26
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faratech wants to merge 1 commit intobo0ts:masterfrom
Open
Fix buffer overflow vulnerability in format()#26faratech wants to merge 1 commit intobo0ts:masterfrom
faratech wants to merge 1 commit intobo0ts:masterfrom
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The format() function used a fixed 391-byte buffer without bounds checking. User-controlled format strings (via +format argument) could overflow this buffer, causing stack smashing. Changes: - Add bufsize parameter to format() - Add bounds checking before all buffer writes - Replace strcpy with length-limited memcpy - Replace sprintf with snprintf - Check buffer space in main loop condition The output is now safely truncated if it exceeds buffer size.
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That sounds reasonable enough to me. Anyone against? |
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Summary
Fix a buffer overflow vulnerability in the
format()function where user-controlled format strings (via+formatargument) could overflow the fixed 391-byte output buffer.Vulnerability Details
+formatProof of Concept
Changes
bufsizeparameter toformat()functionstrcpywith length-limitedmemcpysprintfwithsnprintfOutput is now safely truncated if it would exceed buffer size.